Mastodon's federation introduces UX challenges.
One that worries me a lot is about message forgery. Anyone can forge a twoot, even cross-server.
Whereas Twitter Inc might be trustworthy enough to not forge transcripts. Anyone can run a Mastodon server and might want to abuse it to influence people (see Russian troll campaigns).
Should Mastodon "home servers" cryptographically sign updates? Should there be end-to-end signatures? Anyone has thoughts on this?
@fj would like to see some sort of signing for messages. Any encryption is better than none IMHO
I can see this platform being used by some state level players attempting to control.
@trwnh Blocking entire federated instances that are up to no good is definitely a plus. Is this already implemented? and who would do the blocking?
@fj @just_a_warning Yeah, admins can blacklist instances or users from appearing in the federated timeline.