This coming Monday at 18:00 UTC the Wasabi Research Club will be a discussion about how CoinJoin privacy can be analyzed in terms the sub-transaction model introduced in the Knapsack mixing paper.

We will be slowly going through the linked notes (still being edited), and see how far we can get in the first of a series of discussions.

Please join if you want to understand & critique the thought process behind the CoinJoins approach being implemented in Wasabi 2.0.

gist.github.com/nothingmuch/87

for the first time, i'm seeing more (tor v3 + i2p) peers on my node than tor v2 ones #bitcoin

I've made massive strides on CapTP for @spritelyproject and honestly, I think this is the most important work I've done in my life. But it's hard to explain *why* when few people even know what CapTP *is*.

So: CapTP explainer 馃У, right here (with blogpost to follow):

Native segwit (bech32) (p2wpkh) (BIP84) wallets are the default in Joinmarket, as of just now, i.e. it is in master branch. Release soon.

This means that if you start the software today you will create those wallets and use the joinmarket bot pit for those wallets and create coinjoins with them, by default; you can set `native=false` in the config if you want, however. See docs/ directory for details.

Please publicize this where you can for users' plausible deniability when starting new bots.

Some thoughts about estimating anon set sizes in CoinJoins, I would welcome any inputs, especially critical ones =)

github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasa

Wow, this is kind of awful.
cozyit.com/french-bar-owners-a
It seems that in the modern world, if you run *any* business, not just a bank, you are an arm of law enforcement.

Thinking about using fountain codes to improve WabiSabi coordination privacy, would appreciate feedback

github.com/zkSNACKs/WabiSabi/i

rough sketch of WabiSabi credential bootstrap and unified registration requests including proofs (see CredentialTests.cs or last commit):

github.com/zkSNACKs/WalletWasa

What would you estimate is the size of the market for transaction surveillance? My best guess is on the order of $10M-100M, leaning towards tens, based on recollections of investment in companies.

Relatedly, do you know of any chain analysis companies that deal only with Bitcoin?

we did a thing:

youtube.com/watch?v=U6WdW0Zbo9

i ramble at length about wabisabi and bitcoin privacy more generally, and slightly misrepresent some important research because my memory is unreliable^W^W^W^W^Wto confuse surveillance capitalists ;-)

Design for a CoinSwap Implementation for Massively Improving Bitcoin Privacy and Fungibility

gist.github.com/chris-belcher/

Alice sends tx A->B but the coins actually end up in Z. Then when normie Carol sends a tx an analyst must deal with possibility that Carol's coins disappeared too

Good news: the sale of the .org domain to Ethos Capital, the private equity firm that was supposed to buy it, has been rejected!
eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/vict
#SaveDotOrg

I wrote what I hope is an intuitive explanation of how keyed-verification anonymous credentials can be used to build CoinJoin transactions, sharing here for feedback before publishing it more widely

gist.github.com/nothingmuch/94

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