a story about a huge malicious tor exit operation:

Blog: "How Malicious Tor Relays are Exploiting Users in 2020 (Part I)
>23% of the Tor network’s exit capacity has been attacking Tor users"

Thanks for posting this.
Im curious.
As a mitigation would it be possable to spread a single protocall session over multiple tor exit nodes. Then have the session traffic be recombined within the 2nd to last intermediate node?

@SwindlerOfInsanity I'm not entirely sure about your design but I don't think it is a solution to this problem.

@nusenu well the goal is intended that no one exit node gets a full view of the session. So even if the tor user is routed through compromised exit nodes. A attacker would have to assemble traffic data from multiple exit nodes. Some of that data might have taken a path through nodes which might not be under their control.

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