@Xyc0 @lattera the US did similar things (sans burning). They would take New asserts and split the data up and assign it so it appeared to come from old assets. This would keep penetrations from discovering there was a new asset with good access. But source protection of that caliber is exceptional, you'll never get that from a news room
Closing the Blinds: Four Strategies for Protecting Smart Home Privacy from Network Observers
Noah Apthorpe et al.
...we propose four strategies that device manufacturers and third parties can take to protect consumers from side-channel traffic rate privacy threats: 1) blocking traffic, 2) concealing DNS, 3) tunneling traffic, and 4) shaping and injecting traffic...
A Smart Home is No Castle: Privacy Vulnerabilities of Encrypted IoT Traffic
Noah Apthorpe et al.
...we examine four IoT smart home devices (a Sense sleep monitor, a Nest Cam Indoor security camera, a WeMo switch, and an Amazon Echo) and find that their network traffic rates can reveal potentially sensitive user interactions even when the traffic is encrypted...
Detect Kernel-Mode Rootkits via Real Time Logging & Controlling Memory Access
Igor Korkin et al.
...we propose monitoring and controlling access to the memory in real time using Intel VT-x with EPT. We... develop[ed] MemoryMonRWX, which is a bare-metal hypervisor. MemoryMonRWX is able to track and trap all types of memory access: read, write, and execute. ...MemoryMonRWX is able to protect critical kernel memory areas even when PatchGuard has been disabled
Cryptographic Security Analysis of T-310
Nicolas T. Courtois et al.
T-310 is an important Cold War cipher. It was the principal encryption algorithm used to protect various state communication lines in Eastern Germany throughout the 1980s. ... In this paper we provide a detailed analysis of T-310 in the context of modern cryptography research and other important or similar ciphers developed in the same period.
Countermeasure against Side-Channel Attack in Shared Memory of TrustZone
Na-Young Ahn et al.
In this paper we introduced countermeasures against side-channel attacks in the shared memory of TrustZone. We proposed zero-contention cache memory or policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in TrustZone. And we suggested that delay time of data path of REE is equal or similar to that of data path of TEE to prevent timing side-channel attacks...
Privilege escalation mind map. https://securitymastod.one/media/jxrKynu5v9qzOZY4yJY
Remember, when terrorists rely on lone wolf attacks it's a sign that their command and control channels have completely deteriorated (no doubt because of constant surveillance by Western security forces) and are incapable of any strategically significant action.
More surveillance wouldn't make a difference.
Via @cynicalsecurity on birbsite - https://www.ernw.de/download/Enno_Rey_RIPE74_Structural_Deficits_IPv6.pdf - Structural deficits in IPv6
Points out a lot of nasty issues that v6 has that make it a lot harder to work with than it really needs to be.
Mike Belopuhov (@mike) committed his implementation of FQ-CoDel, "Flow Queue - Controlled Delay" to #OpenBSD: http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-cvs&m=149392068217244&w=2
With the data it has Facebook could help prevent suicides. Instead it sells vulnerable moments to advertisers. https://arstechnica.com/business/2017/05/facebook-helped-advertisers-target-teens-who-feel-worthless/
@HalvarFlake @kwanre in the past few years I decided to go back and re-write my exploits once they are "good enough" because I want them to be more clean/accurate/readable, not just for others, but for myself.
I'll never forget the emails from a leaked email spool around ~2002 when the US Army said one of jduck's exploits was "the cleanest we had ever seen". And it was. ;-)
I suspect the reason why most exploit code is so messy to read is that while writing the exploit you're still figuring out the "architecture and language" of the thing you are attacking.
There are so many false starts, and so many false assumptions when you start.
A simple false assumption can start you down a wrong path for weeks... but often you can't easily verify that it is false before starting.
New #Phrack paper feed: "VM escape - QEMU Case Study" by Mehdi Talbi & Paul Fariello:
Infosec ethics/drama Show more
HackerOne is running a bug bounty program for FlexiSpy, who specialise in spying on spouses https://twitter.com/josephfcox/status/857314960099160067
Their justification: it's "just fixing vulns" https://twitter.com/senorarroz/status/857399800601337856
I don't buy this at all. By providing security testing services to a shady company, you lend legitimacy to them and their brand. I agree with Casey on this one https://twitter.com/caseyjohnellis/status/857362206626689025