🔵 Time to update: Tor Browser 10.0 is out now. Tor Browser 10 ships with Firefox 78.3.0esr, updates NoScript to 11.0.44, and Tor to 0.4.4.5. This release includes important security updates to Firefox.
blog.torproject.org/new-releas

Two new Directors have joined the Tor Project's Board!
Chelsea Komlo, cryptography and privacy researcher and engineer.

After months of work, we have a new stable release series! This series improves our guard selection algorithms, adds v3 onion balance support, improves the amount of code that can be disabled when running without relay support, and small bug fixes.

blog.torproject.org/node/1921

We are hopeful that the future of Tor will be free from DoS. We are looking for the resources and connections to make it happen. (8/8)
Read more on our blog post: blog.torproject.org/stop-the-o

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While Proof-Of-Work has been traditionally used to power blockchains, it was originally suggested for DoS protection. Tor devs have been exploring the space and we believe that such a system could work wonders against the DoS attacks the network is currently experiencing. (7/8)

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Approach 2: A Proof-Of-Work system can be used to greatly increase the resources needed for an attacker to sustain a DoS attack against an onion service. (6/8)

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If we can ensure that attackers cannot get enough tokens to sustain a DoS attack, we can ensure free access to the service. Such tokens can be given to users by the onion service itself, or we can devise a variety of third-party services who provide such tokens to users. (5/8)

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Approach 1: Enter anonymous tokens. Imagine them as anonymous and unlinkable tickets that give you access to an onion service. These tokens were originally proposed for e-cash, but they've since been used in blockchains and in various types of private authentication schemes. (4/8)

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The idea is that clients need to include more information in their connection requests, so the onion service can prioritize which requests it responds to. (3/8)

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Over the past few years, Tor developers have read days of network logs trying to understand and fix the DoS threat. Because of our protocol's inherent asymmetric nature, there is no easy fix, and a more fundamental approach is needed to address it. (2/8)

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Suffering from onion service DoS? Here is a thread on how we would like to fix the problem for good. 👇

We are officially launching the Tor Project Membership Program, a new way for nonprofit and private sector organizations to financially support our work. 🎉
blog.torproject.org/tor-projec

Challenges, priorities, and progress in anti-censorship technology at Tor

Censorship circumvention is a complex and ever evolving problem, and this blog post summarizes our approach in tackling it.

Read more our new blog post: blog.torproject.org/anti-censo

PrivChat Chapter #2 - the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Censorship Circumvention!

Today, at 17:00 UTC ⏰

Hosted by Cory Doctorow

Participants

Felicia Anthonio ()
Cecylia (@torproject)
Vrinda Bhandari (Internet Freedom Foundation)
Arturo Filastò (Project Lead & Engineer, @ooni)

📺 youtu.be/aOOChyMCZH4

End of campaign!

Over 60 organisations and individuals - small, medium, and large onions - have reached out to us to be part of this campaign.

Read more:
blog.torproject.org/more-onion

PrivChat Chapter #2 - The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Censorship Circumvention
Hosted by Cory Doctorow.

[August 28th ∙ 10:00 AM Pacific Time ∙ 17:00 UTC ∙ 13:00 Eastern Time]

Participants

- Felicia Anthonio (Access Now),
- Vrinda Bhandari (Internet Freedom Foundation ),
- Cecylia Bocovich (Tor Project ),
- Arturo Filastò (OONI )

📺 youtu.be/aOOChyMCZH4
🔗 torproject.org/privchat/

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