Craig Duncan<p><span class="h-card" translate="no"><a href="https://threads.net/@aaron.rupar/" class="u-url mention" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">@<span>aaron.rupar</span></a></span> </p><p>The flaw in Roberts decision is that the judiciary also becomes viewed, at best, as a sub-branch of the executive (this follows, since such wide Presidential immunity ceded by SCOTUS subtracts from SCOTUS power over the executive). </p><p>Roberts' decision on general Presidential immunity might be viewed as failing to consider the Constitutional assumptions of shared power: existential SCOTUS co-existing to limit executive power. It would be considered an ultra vires or obiter dicta decision (not within SCOTUS power to self limit, not binding, not effective).</p><p>It likely requires a newly constituted SCOTUS to consider this with sufficient independence and cognitive distance.</p><p><a href="https://mastodon.au/tags/SCOTUS" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>SCOTUS</span></a> <a href="https://mastodon.au/tags/uspol" class="mention hashtag" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank">#<span>uspol</span></a></p>